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Abstract  
We determine optimal consumption paths under a series of returns scenarios for 
charitable endowments with distinct tastes over investment risk and inter-temporal 
substitution. Charities typically prefer smooth consumption paths but are investment-
risk tolerant. Using a recursive, Kreps-Porteus utility function, we model the optimal  
disbursement from an infinitely-lived charitable trust, then, allowing a general form 
for the returns density, we apply stochastic dominance relations to estimate 
income/substitution effects whereby a change in future returns influences the current 
consumption rate. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution rather than risk aversion 
is key: optimal consumption rises or falls as the elasticity diverges from one.  
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  11. Introduction 
The problem we wish to address is how to determine the optimal consumption 
rate for a charity
1. Endowed institutions, foundations and charitable trusts in the UK 
include universities, schools, research institutions, and grant-making charities. The 
top 500 charitable trusts in the UK have assets in excess of £33 billion, and 
investment income of more than £4 billion per annum with a similar amount being 
raised by donation, and US endowments and foundations control more than $1300 
billion in assets (Brown, Garlappi and Tiu 2007). While there are a few studies of the 
US university endowment sector there is otherwise surprisingly little quantitative 
research published in this area
2.  
The more general problem of an entity making spending and investment plans 
over a finite or infinite horizon, subject to uncertainty, has generated a huge literature. 
Models usually comprise time-additive von Neumann-Morgenstern utility and 
uncertainty generated by log-normal diffusions, with explicit solutions for 
consumption and asset portfolios possible in a limited number of cases. 
3 Merton’s 
seminal model (Merton 1969) analyses an infinitely-lived entity with a constant 
relative risk aversion utility function. In the case where all asset returns are log-
normally distributed and some regularity conditions on the rate of discounting of 
future utility are satisfied, the optimal rate of consumption is constant, and optimal 
wealth is log-normal and bounded below. All calculations are done continuously 
                                                 
1 We shall use the terms foundations, endowments and charities interchangeably. 
2 Discussion of optimal spending and investment plans for university endowments originates with 
Tobin (1974), Litvack, Malkiel and Quandt (1974), Nichols (1974), but also features in Merton (1990) 
and more recently in Dybvig (1999), Woglom (2003) and Merton (2003). Empirical studies of the 
structure and investment performance of endowments include Brown (1999), Lerner, Schoar and Wong 
(2005), Brown, Garlappi and Tiu (2007) and Dimmock (2007). 
3 This literature mainly originates with Merton (1969, 1971). Campbell and Viceira (2002) is a standard 
work in the area. In chapter 6, they consider the case where the investor has labour income which could 
proxy for future endowment income or donations to a charity. See also Korn and Korn (2001).  
  2rather than discretely. Although the key features of the Merton solution, a constant 
drawdown and strictly positive wealth, are interesting, and the solution is relatively 
easy to compute, it only partially addresses the problem at hand here. 
First, a continuous time framework is hardly an advantage in describing the 
decision-making of a charitable institution, whose trustees typically meet every six 
months. And since many charitable endowments are set up to provide funding 
perpetually, but work with particular clients or projects within quite short time-
frames, we define the problem in terms of choosing annual spending rates over an 
infinite horizon. Secondly, joint log-normality seems excessively restrictive, given the 
asset classes invested in by endowments, which include hedge funds and private 
equity (see Brown 1999, Wellcome 2005, Lerner, Schoar and Wong 2005, Dimmock 
2007 and Brown et al. 2007). Without making specific distributional assumptions, we 
derive the optimal spending plan for a charity earning risky investment returns, and go 
on to examine the way optimal drawdown responds when the density of investment 
returns is transformed. This is of particular importance to trustees because it allows 
them to carry out scenario analysis. By shifting probability mass from the lower to the 
upper tail of the returns density, and by working with mean-preserving spreads, we 
can examine analytically, and estimate numerically, the trade-off between income and 
substitution effects and the ensuing changes to disbursement rates. Consequently our 
analysis is more robust to the real-world peculiarities of financial data than existing 
models. 
Thirdly, charitable trusts and endowments invest large amounts of wealth in 
risky investment portfolios with volatile returns, but ‘consume’ by making 
disbursements to beneficiaries who value smooth funding streams. Models of the 
  3drawdown of charities and endowments which apply the usual time-additive, von 
Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility functions limit the scope of analysis by 
restricting tastes over inter-temporal substitution and aversion to risk. In particular, 
the class of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility functions constrains relative 
risk aversion to be the inverse of the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution, so that 
agents who have low risk aversion must also be willing to transfer consumption 
through time. However for charitable trusts, risk aversion and aversion to 
intertemporal substitution appear conceptually and practically distinct: charities 
tolerate considerable uncertainty over returns while aiming for fairly smooth 
payments to beneficiaries over time. 
Recursive or non-expected utility preferences as proposed by Kreps and 
Porteus (1978, 1979) allow a partial separation of tastes for risk and inter-temporal 
consumption. Whereas the von Neumann-Morgenstern agent is interested only in the 
conditional expectation of all future consumption (the timing of the resolution of 
uncertain outcomes does not matter), the Kreps-Porteus agent also cares how soon 
uncertainty over consumption will be resolved. If an entity is highly risk averse but 
relatively willing to redistribute consumption through time, then they prefer an early 
resolution of uncertainty, but if an entity is fairly tolerant of risk and, relatively 
speaking, dislikes transferring consumption through time, then later resolution is 
better. As Weil (1990) points out, this amounts to a trade-off between the safety and 
stability of utility, where safety is improved by early resolution of risk and stability by 
late resolution. Here we adapt Weil’s version of Kreps-Porteus preferences to the 
dynamic consumption problem of charitable trusts, and newly explore the properties 
of the model under scenario analysis. 
  4We confirm Weil’s (1990) result that the optimal constant drawdown for a 
charity with Kreps-Porteus utility is set by the rule: 
(1 ) 1




− =−  
where   is the proportion of wealth spent each year,  m δ is a parameter which is a 
component of time preference,
4 α  is relative risk aversion, 1/ρ  is the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution and ϕ  is the expected value of 
1 Z
α − % , where Z %  is the gross 
return to the charity’s portfolio. We also find the conditions for the convergence of 
the value function for this problem, a result which to our knowledge has not been 
derived previously.
5
Given plausible parameter values and historical estimates of investment 
returns, optimal drawdown rates might lie between 1% and 3% of wealth per annum 
in real terms. In practice, some charities may be restricted by regulation to minimum 
disbursement quotas (rates of spending out of accumulated wealth). The Canada 
Revenue Agency (2007), for example, currently requires that 3.5% of average value 
of property owned by a charity but not used directly in activities or administration, be 
disbursed each year. At a current inflation rate of nearly 2%, this regulation enforces a 
real drawdown of at least 1.5%. Our analysis suggests that for some preference 
patterns, such regulations may be a binding constraint which reduces the welfare of 
                                                 
4 In a time additive utility modelδ   would simplify to the rate of time preference, but time preference is 
generally endogenous in non-expected utility settings. See Backus, Routledge and Zin (2004) for a 
general discussion of recursive preferences.  
5 Under constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences, the drawdown rule simplifies to 
1
 1( ) m α δϕ =− . Early analysis of a related problem in growth is due to Phelps (1962) and we do not set 
out the full derivation of this special case here but a direct proof involving explicit derivation of the 
value function is available from the authors on request. 
  5the charitable trust.
6 Further, while superficial intuition might predict that spending 
out of an endowment will be positively related to an optimistic investment outlook 
and negatively linked to pessimism, we show that this is true only for a sub-set of 
preferences and the reverse reaction can be optimal. Our estimation of these effects 
indicates that optimal consumption rates are remarkably sensitive to small changes in 
beliefs about future returns distributions. The direction of revisions to optimal 
consumption depends on whether the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is greater 
than or less than one, not on tastes for risk. We use stochastic dominance arguments 
to confirm, extend and illustrate analytical results sketched in Weil (1990) and 
Bhamra and Uppal (2006), which demonstrate the pivotal role of the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution rather than risk aversion for consumption paths.  
2. Literature 
Studies of university endowment behaviour concentrate on finding a drawdown rule 
that satisfies ‘intergenerational equity’ while preserving capital over the long horizon. 
(See, for example, Tobin 1974, Litvack, Makiel and Quandt 1974, and Nichols 1974.) 
Most are not interested in deriving optimal portfolio allocations for endowments. 
Tobin’s (1974) main concern is to improve on arbitrary policies which limit 
consumption from an endowment to either annual cash income (dividends, interest 
and rent) or to annual cash income plus all capital gains. He sets out a more flexible, 
far-sighted drawdown rule that distinguishes between changes to the long-run rate of 
return on assets and temporary revaluation effects, and proposes consuming out of 
permanent income instead of exploiting temporary revaluation effects caused by 
changes in the discount rate. However Woglom (2003) shows that Tobin’s definition 
                                                 
6 We thank Mr Vincent Taubman of TD Asset Management for advice on this issue. 
  6of intergenerational equity (fixed real consumption through time), implies a zero rate 
of inter-temporal substitution. For agents with CRRA utility functions this means 
infinite risk aversion, a hypothesis that is clearly contradicted by endowment 
investment patterns. Using a deterministic, continuous-time model, Woglom confirms 
that endowments should consume from recurrent capital gains, but he relaxes the 
intergenerational equity constraint to allow optimal real consumption to vary over 
time. Here we manage the fundamental tension between inter-generational equity and 
efficient wealth management by introducing Kreps-Porteus preferences, hence 
disentangling tastes for investment risk from tastes for inter-temporal consumption 
transfers. 
University spending and investment was readdressed in later papers by Merton 
(1990, 2003) who considers optimal consumption and portfolio allocation at the 
whole university, rather than the endowment, level. When income streams (gifts, 
bequests etc.) and the costs of university activities covary with investment returns, he 
argues that university portfolio managers can hedge against future cost changes and 
adjust to non-tradable income sources by employing replicating strategies. 
Dybvig (1995, 1999) views the inter-generational equity question differently, 
proposing that most endowments will want short-run spending certainty while 
maintaining long-run viability. In Dybvig’s set-up the endowment maximises CRRA 
utility over current spending subject to non-negative wealth, and non-negative, non-
decreasing spending, hence utility is still time-additive and separable conditioning on 
consumption never falling, and tastes for risk and inter-temporal substitution are 
linked. By moving a varying proportion of funds into the risk-free asset as the level of 
spending increases, the institution creates a riskless perpetuity matched to the current 
  7minimum spending level while maintaining exposure to risky returns, and the 
resulting strategy is a dynamic generalisation of constant proportion portfolio 
insurance.
7
While Dybvig’s proposal is an interesting financial engineering plan for 
endowments, his model takes a more rigid approach to preferences than seems 
necessary for charities in general, and so we build our analysis in a framework which 
allows more flexible inter-temporal consumption and investment plans. 
3. Defining the problem 
The standard problem for inter-temporal utility maximisation is to find the optimal 
functional form for consumption and the set of asset-allocations that maximise the 
expected multi-period utility of wealth functional through time. Indeed, in many 
cases, foundations state in their charter that they are endowed to provide some sort of 
support in perpetuity, but the needs of their clients, at least in a research context, may 
be very short-lived indeed. One large UK foundation, for example, offers funding to 
charity projects over a two to three year horizon subject to an option for either the 
charity or the beneficiary to withdraw at six months notice. Here we assume that 
charities are infinitely lived but make annual consumption plans, making calculations 
easier and rendering any finite-horizon bequest function irrelevant.  
3.1. Recursive utility 
Following Weil (1990) and Bhamra and Uppal (2006), we find the closed form 
solution for the optimal consumption path of an infinitely-lived entity which 
                                                 
7 Constant proportion portfolio insurance is the optimal investment strategy of an investor or 
endowment protecting a fixed minimum level of consumption, a result implicit in Merton (1971) and 
explicit in Kingston (1989). 
  8maximises a discrete-time recursive utility function. The aggregator function for 
utility has two arguments, the first represents the value of current consumption and 
the second represents expected future utility over uncertain future consumption: 
1
1 ( 1) / ( 1) ( 1) / ( 1)
1
[, ]












−+ + − −
≡
−−
α α ρ − − −  (1) 
where (0,1), 0,  and 0 δ αρ ∈> >  and where Ct is consumption in the form of 
payments to worthy causes and costs.
8
The aggregator function represents time preference in (1), so that the 
derivative of U  with respect to expected future utility can be viewed as a 
subjective discount factor. If U  is convex with respect to expected future utility, 
the agent prefers early resolution of uncertainty, or safety over stability. If U is 
concave with respect to its second argument, then the agent prefers a stable certainty 




δ  is the subjective 
discount factor in the case of certainty and in the linear constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA) case where α ρ = . 
Consider an agent who faces two lotteries offering consumption over three 
periods which differ only by the timing of the resolution of the lottery.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
If we assume that the agent discounts risk according to C
1 α − , that each branch 
of the consumption path is equally likely, and we fix  2 α = , the certainty equivalent 
                                                 
8 We would like to thank Professor James Sefton for persuading us of the applicability of this approach. 
  9of expected future utility at time t1 is 1.67 for lottery A and either 5 or 1 for lottery B 
depending on the branch selected by the lottery. Similarly, the conditional variance of 
lottery A at time t1 is non-zero (=4), but the conditional variance of lottery B is zero. 
If we stood at time t0 and computed the certainty equivalent of A and B, they would 
both be 8.21 and indistinguishable in terms of von Neumann-Morgenstern 
preferences. However, under Kreps-Porteus preferences, lottery A presents a more 
risky conditional path, but with less variation in certainty equivalent consumption 
over time, whereas B is a less risky conditional path with larger swings in certainty 
equivalent consumption. 
It is straightforward to show that the convexity or concavity of  depends 
on the relative sizes of 
(.,.) U
α  and ρ , being convex when α ρ >  and concave when 
α ρ < . Convexity implies more rapidly increasing patience and concavity more 
slowly increasing patience as expected future utility rises. Agents who are more risk 
tolerant and value smoothness (α ρ < ) prefer late resolution (lottery A), and agents 
who dislike risk but tolerate larger swings in certainty equivalent utility (α ρ > ) 
prefer early resolution (Lottery B). 
Another way to view the parameters of the model is to recognise that the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion for timeless gambles is α  and the constant 
elasticity of inter-temporal substitution for deterministic consumption paths is  1/ρ . 
If either parameter approaches unity, then preferences become logarithmic in that 
dimension, so that we get logarithmic risk preferences when  1 α →  and logarithmic 
inter-temporal substitution preferences when  1. ρ →  Under the special case where 
α ρ = , the utility function represents the preferences of an individual with constant 
  10relative risk-aversion (CRRA) and for whom the inverse of the risk aversion 
parameter is the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution.  
3.2. Wealth  
The amount of money available to the charity for investment,  t I , is given by, 
      -  tt t t I WD C =+ ,   (2) 
where   is the wealth at time t and   is the income from donations or bequests. If  t W t D
t I  is invested in n assets, buying  shares in the i , it N




     ti t i t I NP = ∑ .   (3) 
If one defines the return to the i
th asset as the random variable 









     
n
t t it it
i
WI w z +
=
= ∑ %  (5) 
where , represents the relative weights of the assets.   ,, ,     / it it it t wN P =
The charity consumes at the constant proportional rate  tt Cm W = ∀ , by 
spending on administration and providing funding to beneficiaries. Setting aside 
  11questions of portfolio allocation, and assuming that no donation income is received, 
the budget constraint is 
1 () tt t WW C + =−%
t Z  (6) 
where  t Z %  is the random growth in investments from t to t+1. If   tt Cm W = , 
1 (1 ) t Wm W + =− %
t t Z
i Z
1 t V − %
. (7) 























where   is the accumulated value of one unit of wealth invested at 













Proposition 1. If  i Z %  is positive i.i.d and 
1
i Z
α − % is a well defined random variable such 




i Z E α << ∞ , it follows that   for all integer t 
> 0. 
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Proof.  Since  i Z %  is iid, 
1
i Z
α − %  is iid and 






























































⎦  (9) 
3.3. Optimal consumption path 
Optimising (1) subject to (8)
 9, and assuming that  i Z %  is positive i.i.d, the drawdown 
rate is:  
1/ 1/(1 ) (1 )/ 1[ ] m
ρ αρ ρ  (10)  δϕ
−− =−














1/(1 ) [(1 ) ] . m
ρ ρ ψ δ
−− =−  In the special case of CRRA utility, when α ρ = , the 
optimal drawdown simplifies to 
1
1( ) m α δϕ =− . In the case of logarithmic risk 
preferences when  1 α →  the rule is 
1/ 1 m
ρ δ =−  and in the case of logarithmic inter-
temporal substitution preferences when  1 ρ → ,  1 m δ = −  for all values of α . Thus in 
either logarithmic case, the optimal drawdown  1 m δ = −  or 
1/ 1 m
ρ δ =− is independent 







= ∑ % . This result is simple but not terribly useful, as it 
                                                 
9 Appendix A sets out an explicit derivation of  this  result originally reported in Weil (1990) but not 
explicitly derived there.  Bhamra and Uppal (2006) derive the related result for a finite horizon.  
  13depends primarily on the unknown discount factor,  δ . The optimal drawdown is 
independent of asset allocation although the amount of wealth drawn down is not. 
However, as δ  increases m decreases; this means the charity values future utility 
more and the value of current consumption decreases. 
The dynamic spending plan in (10) is feasible (satisfying strictly positive 
wealth and consumption constraints) when the rate of drawdown is positive so that 
, or for the CRRA case, when 
(1 )/(1 ) 1
ρα δϕ
−− < 1 δϕ < . Dynamic stability, such that the 
expected value of optimised utility is bounded at the infinite horizon, is also satisfied 
by 1 δϕ <  in the CRRA case, but the conditions for feasibility and dynamic stability 
do not always coincide in the non-linear recursive utility case.
10
Proposition 2. Under Newton’s generalised binomial theorem (Graham et al. 1994), 








Proof. Newton’s generalised binomial theorem states that for any  r∈  , if  1 a <  
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, 
for  . Using the aggregator function (1), and substituting the value function 
(11), 
/ ax y =
 
10 Smith (1996) derives the feasibility and transversality condition for a related aggregator function in 
continuous time, but the model we work with here is different in significant ways and Smith’s result 
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and (12) will be the sum of the generalised binomial expansion above if,  








































 is a real number. The generalised binomial expansion in this case is:  
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 the sum converges to a finite value. 
  15The convergence condition (13) applies where the discounted value of 
expected future utility (the second argument in the aggregator function) exceeds the 
value of current consumption (the first argument in the aggregator function), and 
amounts to the requirement that the optimal spending rate,   , be less than the saving 
rate, ( . If the reverse is true and the value of current consumption exceeds 
discounted expected utility, then the rate of spending needs to exceed the rate of 
saving to achieve dynamic stability. For most of the empirical applications to follow, 
we need the spending rate to be less than the saving rate. This condition is equivalent 






3.3 Donation income 
We could also generalise the problem to the case where ‘income’ is included, by 
which we mean donations. Donations   are received during the period time t – 1 to t 
but invested at the end of the period. (Income received from donations during the 
period cannot be invested in this discrete time framework until the market opens in 
integer time.) This means that the wealth equation (2) needs to be adjusted to 
t D %
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where   is assumed to equal one.  0 V %
  16It is apparent that no closed-form solution exists for additive income for 
general distributions. However, using the fact that donation income must be positive, 
we can use instead a multiplicative addition to wealth, thus we get, defining the 
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1 1 t t  (18) 
In this case we can derive a solution exactly as for (10), but the new interpretation of 
ϕ  is  
() ( ) ( )
11 1 1
11 1 1 11 () c o v
,
tt t t tt
ZY Y Z
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αα α α
α αα α α
μμ σ −− − −





where previously ϕ  was  1 Z
α μ − . 
This now allows us to include donations in our general model where the 
necessary assumptions are the same as before. We might expect the covariance term 
to be positive (as in the case studied by Merton 1990) but there may be reasons why it 
could be negative.
11 An increase in financial market returns may be co-existent with a 
fall in donations as the population shifts from altruism to greed. 
3.4 Asset allocation 
                                                 
11 Dimmock (2007) offers some analysis of non-investment income to US university endowments. He 
reports low negative correlation between equity indices and non-endowment income which includes 
private donations.   
  17Whilst in principle we could solve numerically for optimal asset allocation, we may 
not wish to do so.
12  This is for two reasons: first, the analysis is complex and 
dependent on distributional assumptions, or, if based on sample data, dependent on 
making assumptions that the future will be similar to the past; and secondly, asset 
allocation is in practice determined by decentralised committees via consultation
13. 
Portfolio optimisation tools are theoretically important but their practical application 
is restricted by significant parameter uncertainty and the complex management 
structures of institutions. 
For any given asset allocation, however determined, we can calculate the 
impact on the optimal drawdown of varying assumptions about the distribution of 
future returns, of changes in risk attitudes and changes in portfolio weights. We 
proceed to this scenario analysis in section 4 below. 
3.5. Empirical illustration 
To illustrate the explicit solution in (10), we create a representative portfolio for a 
charitable trust, simulate returns and compute optimal drawdown rates for some 
feasible parameter ranges. Here we design the portfolio of our artificial entity to 
approximate the publicly available asset allocation of an independent UK biomedical 
research-funding charity, the Wellcome Trust (Wellcome 2005). 
The Wellcome Trust Annual Report for 2005 states the principal investment 
objective as ‘total return in inflation-adjusted terms over the long term in order to 
                                                 
12 Giovannini and Jorion (1993) test the asset pricing implications of the model for the general non- 
i.i.d. case. Bhamra and Uppal (2006) set out the implicit portfolio optimality condition, and explicit 
optimal portfolio weights for  simple examples of constant and stochastic investment opportunity sets. 
13 See Brown et al. (2007) for a description of university endowment structure and their decentralised 
process of investment management. While university endowment boards or investment committees 
make high level investment policy, day to day decisions are often delegated to groups of fund managers 
or to sub-committees. 
  18provide for real increases in annual expenditure while preserving at least the Trust’s 
capital base in real terms’. Consistent with the aim of maximising total returns, more 
than 90% of capital is held in public and private equity, hedge funds and property, 
with a small proportion in gilts and cash. Our returns data are constructed using an 
asset allocation similar to the Trust’s allocation set out in their 2005 annual report 
(Figure 2). If we aimed to analyse the Wellcome Trust as an entity we would want an 
historical return series that reflects changes to investment policy as well as changes to 
underlying returns over time, but it serves our purpose simply to fix portfolio weights 
close to the 2005 report levels and pass these back through the historical asset class 
data. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
We calculate monthly real portfolio returns over the period January 1990 to 
June 2006, (198 observations) deriving individual asset class returns from standard 
indexes, and deflate using consumer prices and earnings data.
14 It is reasonable to 
expect that wages are the majority of costs for most beneficiary projects, and deflation 
using consumer prices alone will overstate the real spending power of the charity, so 
we treat inflation as 50% consumer-price-driven and 50% purely due to wage 
increases.
15  
The mean (log) real return to this portfolio is 4.75% annualised with volatility 
of 13%. Summary statistics in Table 1 show that the data are significantly non-
normal: negatively skewed and leptokurtic. However the autocorrelation structure of 
the de-meaned returns and squared de-meaned returns supports an assumption that 
                                                 
14 See Appendix B  for data sources and calculations. 
15 We use an arbitrary rule for deflation here, but most research into endowment spending (e.g., Tobin 
1974 and Woglom 2003) recognises the importance of an institution-specific deflation procedure, while 
Merton (1990) goes further and suggests hedging strategies for future cost changes. 
  19real portfolio returns are i.i.d. Ljung-Box Q statistics, not reported here, are 
insignificant to at least 50 lags for the de-meaned returns. The squared residuals have 
one significant autocorrelation at lag ten. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Equation (10) above is the optimal rate of drawdown for an infinitely-lived 
charity under a fixed asset allocation, given time preference parameter  δ , 
consumption smoothing parameter ρ , and relative risk aversion α . Another key 
determinant is the mean of the risk-aversion-scaled portfolio return,  
1 () t EZ
α ϕ
− = % . To 
estimate ϕ , we bootstrap the monthly portfolio returns using 120,000 random draws 
from our historical sample, and sum to get 10,000 annual real (gross) returns. We then 












= ∑ % ,   (20) 
for  0.97 δ =  and  0 α > .  
The estimated optimal drawdown rate   is shown in Figure 3 for values of 
the inter-temporal substitution parameter 
ˆ m
ρ  between 0.2 and 5, and with risk aversion  
2.6 α = , an estimated value we infer from the portfolio weights of the Wellcome 
Trust
16. The fine grey curves give an approximate 95% error range for the estimate of 
                                                 
0 ⎤ ⎦
16 The condition for portfolio optimality for this model gives a vector of moment conditions in the 
scaled portfolio return and returns to individual assets given  a constant rate of consumption 
, where R is the return to the risk-free 
asset (see Bhamra and Uppal 2006 equation (17) under i.i.d. returns). We use this system of moment 
conditions and the portfolio returns data described above to estimate 
() (1 ) / 1
11 () () ti t ti t E m Zz R E Zz R
αα αρ ρ −− −−
++ ⎡⎤ ⎡ −= −= ⎣ ⎣⎦
%%
ˆ 2.6 α =  by Generalised Method 
of Moments assuming that the real risk-free rate is zero. Estimation results are available from the 
authors on request. 
  20m. Since under feasibility 
1/ (1 )







1 < , we can fit a beta distribution to 1000 
bootstrapped estimates of 
1/ (1 )








 by maximum likelihood, after filtering out 
values that do not meet the feasibility and boundary conditions. From the estimated 
beta parameters, we can back out  ( )
1
,0.025 ˆ 1 1 0.025 vF α
− −= −  and 
( )
1
,0.975 ˆ 1 1 0.975 vF α
− −= −  as a guide to the accuracy of  . Consistent with the 
solution for logarithmic inter-temporal substitution preferences, the optimal 
consumption rate is 3% per annum when 
ˆ m
1 ρ = . As tolerance for consumption transfer 
through time decreases and rho increases, the disbursements falls from around 4.7% 
when  0.2 ρ = , reaching 2.8% when  5 ρ = .
17
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
The error range around m  widens rapidly as the elasticity of inter-temporal 
substitution (EIS) diverges from one in either direction. Figure 4 graphs the estimated 
beta distributions of the optimal drawdown at three indicative values of the inter-
temporal substitution parameter. When the EIS is relatively high at 1.33 ( 0.75 ρ = ), 
the error distribution is more right-skewed and disbursed than when the EIS falls to 
0.8 ( 1.25 ρ = ) where the distribution is more tightly packed around the 3% 
logarithmic drawdown. However as EIS moves away from one, falling to 0.2 ( 5 ρ = ), 
the probability distribution becomes more right-skewed again, and uncertainty over 
                                                 
17 We choose parameters that are roughly consistent with the empirical estimates of tastes for risk and 
inter-temporal substitution made by Epstein and Zin (1991) who find that the elasticity of inter-
temporal substitution (EIS) is small and always less than one (implying that  1 ρ > ) and that risk 
preferences are close to one, conditions which together imply a preference for the late resolution of 
uncertainty. Earlier studies find a low value for the EIS, but for a contrasting view see Gruber (2006).   
  21the optimal spending rate increases. This pattern indicates the increasing importance 
of the stochastic risk-scaled returns parameter   ( )
1 EZ
α ϕ
− =  to optimal consumption 
paths as the EIS diverges from one, since at  1 ρ = , consumption depends only on the 
discount parameter δ , which is assumed to be known with certainty.  
Hence we conclude that a moderately risk averse charity will spend between 
5% and 2% of wealth each year, but that the uncertainty surrounding that optimal 
solution is very large and increasing as the EIS diverges from one. 
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE] 
4. Scenario analysis 
Trustees need a way of assessing whether their chosen drawdown rate is robust to 
changes in beliefs about future returns, an exercise usually called scenario analysis. A 
natural approach is to set past history as the benchmark and build optimistic or 
pessimistic outlooks relative to recent experience. In this section we set out a simple 
procedure to conduct scenario analysis that is not highly dependent on complicated 
assumptions about distributions of returns.  
The influence of the returns distribution on optimal spending rates for a 
charity is via the expectation of risk-scaled portfolio returns,   ( )
1 EZ
α ϕ
− = % . To gauge 
the optimal spending response to optimistic and pessimistic investment scenarios, we 
consider changes in the expected risk-scaled portfolio return ϕ , where we keep tastes 
for risk, α , and inter-temporal substitution, ρ , fixed but vary distributional 
  22parameters. The change in optimal drawdown as ϕ  varies depends on the relative size 




















Since ,   and  δ ρϕ  are positive, the response of the optimal drawdown to an 
increase in ϕ  will be positive when   1 and  1 ρ α >< , and when  1 and  1 ρ α < > . If 
both α  and ρ  are greater than one or less than one, then the response of the optimal 
drawdown to an increase in ϕ  will be negative. However we need to account for the 
influence on ϕ  itself of changes in relative risk aversion. It turns out that this can be 
done using the properties of stochastic dominance. 
4.1 First order stochastic dominance 
Proposition 3. If  i Z
Δ  first order stochastic dominates (FSD)  i Z , then ϕ  is increased if 
01 α <<  and decreased if  1 α > . 
Proof. Note that if  i Z
Δ FSD  i Z  t h e n   () () FZ F Z Δ ≤  where   and   are the 
respective distribution functions. Denote expectations with respect to them by   
and   . First order stochastic dominance implies that 
( ) FZ Δ () FZ
( ) EΔ ⋅
( ) E ⋅ [ ] [ ] () () EG Z E G Z Δ ≥  for 
, any increasing function. () G ⋅
18 If  ( )
1 ,0 1 , GZ Z
α α
− = << then  ( ) GZ is increasing 
                                                 
18 See Huang and Litzenberger (1988) for proof. 
  23in Z, hence under   ,  ( ) FZ Δ ϕ  is increased. If  1 α >  we have  () G ⋅  a decreasing 
function in Z and under  the reverse happens,  ( ) FZ Δ ϕ  decreases.
19
We now set out a method for reshaping the returns distribution to reflect 
optimistic and pessimistic scenarios for investment. For optimistic outlooks, our aim 
is to make extremely poor payoffs unlikely relative to the recent past by shifting tail 
mass from the left to the right tail of the distribution. For an arbitrary positive 
continuous density, pdf(x); we consider two points  l x  and  u x  and the probabilities 
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It is easy to check that  '( ) pdf x  is still a well-defined density although no 
longer continuous at  . lu x xo rx x ==  Note that since we assumed a continuous density 
                                                 
19 Bhamra and Uppal (2006) derive expressions for the income and substitution effects of changes in 
the risk-free rate on consumption and portfolio choice in the finite horizon setting. 
  24with zero probability mass at any point, the discontinuities induced by our 
transformation will not affect the existence of the integrals. Furthermore the above 
transformation can be called optimistic in that it transfers probability from the lower 
tail to the upper tail of the density while a pessimistic transformation does the reverse. 
Corollary. If   is a positive increasing function then  () Gx
00
() ' () () () () G x pdf x dx G x pdf x dx
∞∞
>< ∫∫  (24) 
for '( ) pdf x  the result of an optimistic (pessimistic) transformation. An opposite 
result applies to positive decreasing functions. If we now apply the result for 
1 ( i EZ )
α ϕ
− = % , we see that 
1
i Z
α − %  is positive increasing for 01 α < <  hence ϕ ϕ Δ > , and 
positive decreasing for  1 α >  so that ϕ ϕ Δ < , where Δ is a positive transformation. 
We consider now the change in m under a FSD shift for each of four 
combinations of α  and  ρ .  
For 01 ρ << , 01 α << , 
0  increases under  ( )


















For 0 1 ρ << ,  1 α > , 
0  decreases under  ( )


















  25For  1 ρ > , 01 α << , 
0  increases under  ( )


















For 1 ρ > ,  1 α > , 
0  decreases under  ( )



















So regardless of the size of the relative risk aversion parameter, transformations of the 
returns distribution that are described by first order stochastic dominance result in a 
decrease in the optimal rate of drawdown whenever 0 ρ < <  and an increase in the 
optimal rate of drawdown when  1 ρ > . Weil (1990) showed this result for log-
normally distributed portfolio returns, but here we have generalised to the case of any 
well-behaved continuous returns distribution.  
The former case 0 1 ρ <<  describes charities with high elasticities of inter-
temporal substitution, and the latter   1 ρ > , agents with low elasticities of inter-
temporal substitution. For optimistic returns scenarios, and where  0 1 ρ << , the 
substitution effect dominates the income effect and the charity is willing to transfer a 
higher rate of consumption through time into the future and spending rates fall, 
whereas for  1 ρ > , charities with low elasticities of intertemporal substitution find the 
prospect of good times now compelling, the income effect dominates the substitution 
effect, and they increase current spending rates. These effects are independent of 
tastes for risk. 
4.2. Empirical illustration  
  26Figures 5 and 6 show the impact on optimal drawdown of a range of transformations 
of the distribution of   i Z % , the portfolio return.  The two panels in Figure 5 show 
graphs for optimal spending rate when  0.5 α =  and 2.6, and ρ  ranges from 0.4 to 1. 
A positive rescaling of the returns distribution of size 0.02 shifts 2% of the total 
probability mass from the left to the right tail of the distribution and matches an 
optimistic outlook for investment returns. In the same way, a negative rescaling of 
0.02 shifts the same probability mass from the right to the left tail, when the 
investment outlook is bleak. Whenever  1 ρ =  the optimal spending rate is 3% p.a., but 
as ρ  shrinks, EIS increases and spending rises with optimistic expectations and falls 
with pessimistic expectations. 
20 For   0.8 ρ =  and   0.5 α = , the optimal spending rate 
based on historical returns is 2.6%. As optimism increases, and we shift probability 
mass towards the right tail spending declines so that when right tail returns are 4 
percentage points more probable, spending is down to 1.4% and to 0.05% when the 
right tail probability is 10 percentage points higher. Similarly spending rises to 3.8% 
when the left tail returns are 4 percentage points more probable and reaches 5.8% at 
10 percentage points. For   0.8 ρ =  and   2.6 α = , the pattern is very similar: beginning 
at  3.4%, as optimism increases the right tail by 4 percentage points , spending falls to 
1.9% and to 0.04% for a 10 percentage point shift. When the left tail returns are 4 
percentage points more probable, spending rises to 4.3% and reaches 6.3% at 10 
percentage points.  
                                                 
20 The slightly jagged shape to the surface is caused by the bootstrap process: a different set of random 
draws is made at each combination of ρ   and Δ. Edges of the surface are not smooth because the 
feasibility and boundary conditions are not met for some extreme values of ρ  and α . 
  27We see that a very flexible foundation facing better prospects does best by 
decreasing current spending rates in favour of future consumption, with substitution 
effects dominating income effects. 
[INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE] 
For charities with low elasticities of inter-temporal substitution, where   1 ρ > , 
optimistic transformations of the portfolio returns distribution increase the optimal 
drawdown, as the charity enjoys higher income in the current period rather than 
favouring future consumption. Figure 6 graphs changing spending rates as optimism 
increases and EIS decreases. When  2 ρ =  (EIS = 0.5) and  2.6 α = , optimal spending 
at the historical average return is 2.4% p.a. Reducing the probability of left tail returns 
by 4 percentage points more than doubles optimal spending to 5.2% p.a. The same 
shift in the direction of pessimism reduces spending to 0.5% p.a. As inter-temporal 
substitution becomes even less attractive at say  4 ρ = , (EIS =0.25), a 4 percentage 
point positive shift raises spending from 2.1% to 6% and a 2 percentage point 
negative shift lowers spending to 0.4% p.a. When risk aversion is low, the same 
pattern of changes applies at higher overall consumption rates. 
[INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE] 
4.3. Second order stochastic dominance 
Our first discussion considered changes in the mean of the returns distribution. We 
now consider changes in risk while allowing the mean to stay constant.  
  28Proposition 4. If  i Z
ω second order stochastic dominates (SSD)  i Z  then ϕ  is 
increased if 01 α <<  and decreased if  1 α > . 
Proof. Note that if  i Z
ω SSD  i Z  then 
00 () ()
ZZ
F s ds F s ds ω ≤ ∫∫  for all  [0, ] Z ∈∞ where 
 and   are the respective distribution functions. Denote expectations with 
respect to them by   and 
() FZ ω ( ) FZ
( ) Eω ⋅ ( ) E ⋅ . Second order stochastic dominance implies that 
[ ] [ ] () () EG Z E G Z ω ≥  for  , any increasing, concave function. () G ⋅
21 If 
 then  ()
1 ,0 1 , GZ Z
α α
− =< < ( ) GZ is increasing and concave in Z, hence under 
,  () FZ Δ ϕ  is increased. If  1 α >  we have  () G ⋅  a decreasing and convex function in Z 
and under  the reverse happens,  ( ) FZ Δ ϕ  decreases. 
Here we consider a mean-preserving spread of the distribution as a special 
case of SSD. For an arbitrary positive continuous density, pdf(x) where 
2 , ~ (0, ) ix i i x iid ε μ εε σ =+  where 
2
ε σ , we can construct a mean-preserving spread by 
the following transformation of  i x ,  
'( 1 ) ,  0 < ix i x μ ωε ω =+ + < ∞  (25) 
We can see that the mean of both distributions is  
() (' ) ii Ex Ex x μ == , (26) 
and that for 0<ω <∞, the variance of the transformed variable  'i x  is greater than the 
variance of  i x , 
                                                 
21 For proof see Huang and Litzenberger (1988). 
  2922 2 var( ') (1 ) var( ) i x i x ε ε ω σ =+ > = σ , (27) 
which are sufficient conditions for second order stochastic dominance of  ( ) pdf x  over 
'( ) pdf x . 
We can also shrink the variance of  () pdf x  by choosing an optimistic 
transformation such that -1< 0 ω < . A pessimistic transformation can be defined as an 
increase in risk when 0<ω <∞.  
Corollary. If   is a positive increasing, concave function then  ( ) Gx
00
() ' () () () () G x pdf x dx G x pdf x dx
∞∞
>< ∫∫  (28) 
for  '( ) pdf x  the result of an optimistic (pessimistic) transformation. An opposite 
result applies to positive decreasing, convex functions. If we again apply the result for 
1 ( i EZ )
α ϕ
− = % , we see that 
1
i Z
α − %  is positive increasing and concave for 01 α <<  hence 
ω ϕ ϕ > , and positive decreasing and convex for  1 α >  so that  ω ϕ ϕ < , where ω  is an 
optimistic transformation. 
We consider now the change in m for each of four combinations of α  and ρ .  
For 01 ρ << , 01 α << , 
2
2 0, 0  increases under  ( )

















  30For 0 1 ρ << ,  1 α > , 
2
2 0, 0  decreases under  ( )

















For 1 ρ > , 01 α << , 
2
2 0, 0  increases under  ( )

















For 1 ρ > ,  1 α > , 
2
2 0, 0  decreases under  ( )

















If our transformation of  i Z %  shrinks the variance, then our drawdown (m) 
decreases if 0 1 ρ << . If  1 ρ >  , SSD implies the opposite effect where m increases as 
risk shrinks and decreases as risk rises (for a constant expected return). This result 
confirms the reasoning in Weil (1990) that responses to mean-preserving spreads of 
the returns distribution depend only on the value of ρ .  
4.4. Empirical illustration  
In Figures 7 and 8 we graph the optimal drawdown when the variance, but not 
the mean, of the distribution of  i Z %  is increased or decreased. In Figure 7 we 
optimistically shrink the standard deviation from its historical value to almost zero 
(rescaling to -1), or pessimistically raise it to twice the historical size (rescaling to 1), 
while setting  0.5,2.6 α =  and allowing ρ  to range from 0.4 to 1. For  0.8 ρ =  and 
0.5 α = , the optimal spending rate based on historical returns is around 2.7% and 
shrinking the volatility by 50% causes a small decline in drawdown towards 2.6%, 
  31while increasing risk by 50% increases drawdown by about the same amount. The 
historical benchmark spending level for  0.4 ρ =  is around 1.2% p.a. and reducing 
volatility by 50% lowers this towards 0.8%, while a 50% increase moves spending 
towards 1.9%. When risk aversion is higher at 2.6 and   0.8 ρ = , the benchmark 
spending rate is 3.1% p.a., and reducing(increasing) risk by 50% decreases (increases) 
drawdown to 2.7% (3.8%). These changes are small compared with the FSD 
scenarios, but support the analytical prediction that optimistic influences on the 
returns distribution decrease spending rates when the EIS is high.  
[INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE] 
For charities with low elasticities of inter-temporal substitution, when   1 ρ > , 
increases in risk lower optimal spending rates with the effect becoming more dramatic 
as EIS shrinks. Figure 8 graphs changing spending rates as optimism over volatility 
increases and EIS decreases. When and EIS = 0.5 and  2.6 α = , optimal spending at 
the historical average return is 2.8% p.a. increasing to 3.5% as volatility is halved, and 
falling to 1.3% as volatility rises by 50%. When   4 ρ = , (EIS =0.25), the same 
experiment sees spending rise from 2.7% to 3.8% for a halving of volatility and fall to 
0.5% for a 50% increase in volatility. When the EIS is low but risk tolerance is high 
( 4 ρ =  and  0.5 α = ) benchmark spending is 3.9% p.a. If volatility is halved, spending 
rises to 4.1%, and falls to 3.5% for a 50% increase. 
[INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE] 
We conclude that lower current spending as a reaction to improved prospects 
is not necessarily irrational or irresponsible. On the contrary, such episodes could be 
evidence for high level of willingness to transfer disbursements into the future. 
  32However if, as we expect, most charities favour smoother consumption, then 
unwillingness to shift consumption towards the future dominates and optimal 
spending rises and falls as the outlook brightens or blackens. Somewhat surprisingly, 
this is true whatever the charity’s attitude to risk. Preferences for early or late 
resolution of uncertainty do not determine the direction of response. While the 
benchmark level of spending, m, will be sensitive to both risk aversion and the inter-
temporal elasticity, whether spending decreases or increases from that level in 
response to scenario changes depends only on whether the elasticity of inter-temporal 
substitution is less than or greater than one. 
5. Conclusion 
Charities whose trust deeds specify a very long (infinite) horizon and who generate 
independent and identically distributed returns from investment portfolios can operate 
optimally using simple, constant drawdown policies. The ideal rate of spending for a 
charitable trust is a function of preferences for safety and smoothness in expected 
consumption, tastes which can be parameterised in a Kreps-Porteus utility framework.  
Our contribution is to investigate the responsiveness of these drawdown 
policies to changes in the shape of very general returns distributions and to tease out 
the empirical implications of such changes. We identify the effects of optimistic and 
pessimistic transformations of the returns distribution using the properties of 
stochastic dominance. Without assuming a specific functional form for the probability 
density, we derive the effects on optimal drawdown due to a transfer of probability 
mass from the lower to the upper tail (FSD), and vice versa, and the effects of mean-
  33preserving spread (SSD). This allows us to incorporate, into both analysis and 
estimation, the important idiosyncratic features of actual returns distributions. 
While the optimal draw down rate depends on both tastes for risk and the 
charity’s elasticity of inter-temporal substitution, scenario analysis shows that the 
whether optimal spending rates increase or decrease in response to first and second 
order dominance changes in returns depends entirely on the EIS. Whenever the EIS is 
less than one, income effects dominate substitution effects and optimistic changes to 
returns (FDS and/or SSD) raise current spending. The reverse holds when the EIS is 
greater than one, and when the EIS is unitary, spending rates are immune to revision 
and depend only on time preference. 
While charitable trusts obviously make investment decisions, it is not clear 
that investment choices are always joint with choice over spending rates. By treating 
charities with different preferences as if they actually hold the same portfolio, we 
clarify the trade-off between income and substitution effects and demonstrate that an 
equivalent change in expectations can produce very different, but nevertheless equally 
optimal, reactions from trustees. 
  34Appendix A 
The problem is to maximise utility defined by the aggregator function: 
1
1 ( 1) / ( 1) ( 1) / ( 1)
1
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−+ + − −
≡
−−
α α ρ − − −
t t Z %
 (29) 
with respect to consumption   and subject to the wealth constraint   t C
1 (1 ) t Wm W + =− % . (30)   
Following the well-known result for standard CRRA preferences, Weil 















  (31) 
and that   where  t Cm W = t ψ  and   are to be determined  m
Substituting (31) into (29) and using the expressions for consumption and the 
















− − − ⎧⎫ ⎪⎪ ⎡⎤ −+ − ⎨⎬ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎪⎪ ⎩⎭ =
−−
% −
  (32) 
Maximising (32) over   is the same as maximising over consumption, and 
gives the first order condition as a function of 
m
ψ : 
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If we follow Weil in setting  
then (34) becomes  
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 (37) Appendix B  
Portfolio returns data are monthly from January 1990 to June 2006. A consistent series of returns to hedge funds are not available prior to 
January 1994, so from January 1990-December 1993, the allocation to each of U.K., Global, Emerging and Private Equity was increased by 
0.9% and Hedge Funds set to zero. Total portfolio return is the weighted sum of log changes in each returns index and the cash rate (expressed 
on a monthly basis), less the log change in the inflation rate: 
11
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Asset 
Class  Data  Source  Portfolio weight   Notes 






32.2% Capitalisation-weighted index, for London Stock 




MSCI ex UK  DataStream 
MSWFUK$(RI)~U$, 
translated to BPN using  
BBGBPSP(ER) 
32.0%  The MSCI World Index is a free float-adjusted market 
capitalization index consisting of the 22 developed 









translated to BPN using  
BBGBPSP(ER) 
 
5.0%  The MSCI Emerging Markets Index is a free float-
adjusted market capitalization index consisting of  25 
emerging market country indices. 
UK Gilts  FTA   DataStream 
FTBGTTF(RI)~£ 
 
2.8%  FTA British Government fixed 10-15 years total returns 
index 





7.5% UK  Investment  Property Databank  
Index measures total returns to investment in 
commercial property investment. 











3.6%  Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index is an asset-
weighted hedge fund index and includes only funds, as 
opposed to separate accounts. The Index uses the Credit 
Suisse/Tremont database, which track over 4500 funds, 
and consists only of funds with a minimum of US$50 
million under management, a 12-month track record, 
and audited financial statements. It is calculated and 
rebalanced on a monthly basis, and shown net of all 












11.5%  The index is constructed by DataStream to measure the 
performance of all UK listed investment trusts in the 
private equity sector. 
 
Cash 3-month  CD 
rate 
Bank of England  5.4%  End month sterling certificate of deposit 3 month rate, 
mean of bid-offer. 







  Equally weighted log change in UK CPI- Harmonised 
European Union basis, 2005=100 and UK average 
earnings index, whole economy, seasonally adjusted. 
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This figure shows the proportions of total funds invested in each asset class for simulated portfolio 
returns. Weights are fixed for the whole sample period. A consistent series of returns to hedge funds 
are not available prior to January 1994, so from January 1990-December 1993, the allocation to each of 
U.K., Global, Emerging and Private Equity was increased by 0.9% and Hedge Funds set to zero. 
Appendix B  lists data sources for each returns series. 
  44Table 1: Summary statistics, real annualised portfolio returns 
 
Mean 4.75% 








This table shows summary statistics for monthly log returns to the portfolio constructed using weights 
and asset classes from Figure 1. Portfolio returns are the weighted sum of the log changes in indexes 
for each asset class, less the log change in inflation. See Appendix B  for a complete description of data 
sources. Data are monthly from January 1990 to June 2006: 198 observations. 


































This Figure graphs the estimated optimal rate of drawdown for a charity with assets invested as for 
Figure 1 and assuming that relative risk aversion,  2.6 α = , where the optimal drawdown is given by 
1/ (1 )




















= ∑ %  where the gross portfolio returns  i Z %  are computed 
using 10,000 random draws from the historical portfolio returns series, the rate of time preference is 
0.97 δ =  and 0.2 5 ρ <<  The fine grey lines represent beta distribution approximations to a 95% 
error range for  .  ˆ m
  46Figure 4: Drawdown error distribution 
 



























This figure graphs the estimated beta distributions of 
1/ (1 )








when relative risk 
aversion,  2.6 α =  and  0.75, 1.25, 5.0 ρ = . The simulated values of the optimal drawdown are 
computed as for Figure 3. 
  47Figure 5: Optimal drawdown under transformations of the portfolio returns 






































































This Figure shows optimal rates of drawdown, m, when the distribution of portfolio returns is re-weighted by the 
factor  , relative risk aversion  Δ 2.6,0.5 α = , and 01 ρ < ≤ . We sort the original 198 real returns into 
percentiles and divide the dataset into three sections: d1 = 40 lowest observations representing the 1-20th 
percentiles, d2 = 118 observations representing the middle 20-80
th percentiles, and d3=40 observations 
representing the 80-100
th percentiles. We rescale the probability of low (high) returns by increasing the probability 






PP P P P
d
== + Δ =
∑
l − Δ and the probability of draws from the 
middle stays constant. We draw returns from the low, middle and high range randomly with replacement and in 
proportion to the assigned probability, and compute 
1
i Z
α − % , ϕΔ , and m.  
  48Figure 6: Optimal drawdown under transformations of the portfolio returns 








































































This Figure shows optimal rates of drawdown, m, when the distribution of portfolio returns is re-weighted by the 
factor  , relative risk aversion is equal to 0.5 or 2.6, and 1 Δ 5 ρ ≤ ≤ . We sort the original 198 real returns into 
percentiles and divide the dataset into three sections: d1 = 40 lowest observations representing the 1-20th 
percentiles, d2 = 118 observations representing the middle 20-80
th percentiles, and d3=40 observations 
representing the 80-100
th percentiles. We rescale the probability of low (high) returns by increasing the probability 
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d
== + Δ =
∑
l − Δ and the probability of draws from the 
middle stays constant. We draw returns from the low, middle and high range randomly with replacement and in 
proportion to the assigned probability, and compute 
1
i Z
α − % , ϕΔ , and m. 
  49Figure 7: Optimal drawdown under mean-preserving spread transformations of the 






































































This Figure shows optimal rates of drawdown, m, when the variance of the distribution of portfolio returns is re-
weighted by the factor ω , relative risk aversion is 2.6 or 0.5, 01 ρ ≤ ≤ . We draw 120,000 of the original 198 
real returns with replacement to compute 10,000 annual gross portfolio returns  i Z % . We then compute the mean-
zero errors  ( ii ) Z Z ε =− , resample these without replacement and compute  ( )
1 1 '( 1 ) ii ZZ
α α ωε
− − =+ + %  
for  11 ω −≤ ≤, ϕΔ , and m, for 01 ρ ≤≤ . 
  50Figure 8: Optimal drawdown under mean-preserving spread transformations of the 







































































This Figure shows optimal rates of drawdown, m, when the variance of the distribution of portfolio returns is re-
weighted by the factor ω , and relative risk aversion is 0.5 or  2.6, 15 ρ ≤ ≤ . We draw 120,000 of the original 
198 real returns with replacement to compute 10,000 annual gross portfolio returns  i Z % . We then compute the 
mean-zero errors  ( ) ii Z Z ε =− , resample these without replacement and and compute 
()




− − =+ + % 1  for  1 ω −≤ , ϕΔ , and m, for15 ρ ≤ ≤ .   ≤
  51